Three reasons China’s increasing assertiveness is a threat to Asia’s long-standing peace and stability


UNV Desk:

Asia today is on the edge of a harrowing precipice, and not only because of ongoing concerns about the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The recent assertive turn in China’s approach to the world may be of even greater significance as it potentially signals an end to the region’s long post-Cold-War period of relative peace and stability.

A few years ago, similar predictions spurred by an uptick in conflict in the East and South China seas proved to be overblown as such territorial disputes did not lead to war. China’s naysayers appeared to be little more than a flock of proverbial chicken littles.

Concern is more warranted now, given three particularly troublesome developments. First, in recent weeks, China and India significantly ramped up their long-standing border conflict. The reported fighting between the two sides stands in stark contrast to the confidence-building measures they signed in the 1990s that established the framework for a robust period of detente between the two Asian giants.

The number of reported deaths and casualties from the skirmish also far exceed those recorded in any of China’s outstanding border disputes in many years. It now appears Beijing and New Delhi are somewhat backing down from conflict.

However, the fact that fighting of any kind occurred in the Himalayas stands as a watershed moment in China’s relationship with India and the rest of Asia. It has broken a long track record of Chinese restraint when it comes to the use of force.

Second, Beijing is increasingly throwing its weight around in the South China Sea. It is doing so from a significantly stronger position than before. In recent years, Beijing’s naval force projection capabilities have been upgraded and expanded. In addition, its island-building strategy has created a new reality – a durable Chinese physical presence throughout these contested waters.

Until now President Xi Jinping had largely refrained from using these new strengths as a springboard for more assertive policymaking. However, in the past few weeks, Chinese reserve has wavered.

Beijing has bluntly contested the claims both Vietnam and the Philippines have made in the South China Sea and strenuously objected to the recent US show of force there. Such moves have, so far, not led to a row comparable to the one that has rocked the Sino-Indian border region, but they have significantly escalated tensions in Southeast Asia.

Third, many observers have concluded that China’s passage of new national security legislation for Hong Kong contravenes the Basic Law that has governed the city since the resumption of Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997. As such, it suggests that Xi is no longer playing by the same rules of the game that his predecessors followed. He will be much more forceful than they were in extinguishing perceived threats to China’s territorial integrity.

The bill has already had a chilling effect on Hong Kong. While some in the city appear to welcome the law, others have erased their social media profiles which expressed support for the ongoing protests. Leaders of that movement have taken steps to reduce their visibility while weighing how they might continue to voice their opposition. A series of arrests of protesters has also already occurred.

Attempting to bring Hong Kong to heel in this manner speaks volumes about the Chinese leader’s emerging approach to the rest of Asia, especially Taiwan. It has put the island on notice that Beijing places a premium on national unity wherever it is contested. Given this resolve, and the fact that many in Taiwan no longer view it as a part of China, the prospects for an escalation of conflict between Beijing and Taipei has grown.

These trends make it clear that those expecting doom in Asia can no longer be dismissed. A breakdown of the status quo is in progress, but it is not yet complete. It would be if the current blustering between China and the United States escalates into a direct military engagement in the South China Sea.
As bad as things now are, they would be dramatically worse if the two superpowers come to something more than rhetorical blows.
It could also be worse if China ramps up its conflict with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Nationalist sentiment in both countries over this conflict is so heated that a reprise of the 2012 stand-off over this maritime territory would be especially explosive and destabilising.

There is a greater risk, too, if China uses the new security law to unabashedly crack down on Hong Kong. Should Beijing use the legislation as a cudgel, it would end the city’s special relationship with the rest of China and the world. Finally, if Beijing extends such a stance to its Taiwan policy, it is likely to lead to war in the Taiwan Strait.

The sun will rise again tomorrow over Asia. It will do so over a terrain that is more fluid and worrisome than it has been in decades, though. If the sky there falls in the coming days, it should not be unexpected. The warning signs are everywhere.

Allen Carlson is an associate professor in Cornell University’s Government Department. He is also the Michael J. Zak Chair of history for US-China relations and director of the Levinson China and Asia-Pacific Studies programme at Cornell


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